




# **WEST ANBAR**

# **PLAN OF ACTION REVISION**

## **2021–2024**



JANUARY 2023

In March 2021, the Ministry of Planning (MoP) and the Ministry of Migration and Displacement (MoMD) presented the National Plan for Getting the Displaced Back to their Liberated Areas (National Plan) to the Council of Ministers Secretariat (COMSEC). The National Plan provides a national framework to address displacement by identifying priority population groups, activities—along with their estimated costs, and assigns specific responsibilities between the executive branches of government and local government.

Building on the National Plan, the humanitarian, development, stabilization, and peace community in Iraq is committed to supporting the Government of Iraq assist displacement affected communities through the Humanitarian Response Plan, United Nations Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework and Inter-Agency Durable Solutions Strategic and Operational Framework (Operational Framework). Together, these mechanisms enhance existing efforts to support internally displaced persons (IDPs), returnees and other displacement-affected populations to pursue and achieve sustainable solutions to displacement.

The National Plan and the Operational Framework recognize that durable solutions outcomes are pursued at both the national and local levels, as effective durable solutions planning is area-based. An initial set of eight Area-Based Coordination Groups (ABCs) have been identified, including (1) east Anbar (Fallujah and Ramadi); (2) west Anbar (Al-Qa'im, Heet and Haditha); (3) Sinjar; (4) Ba'aj; (5) northern Salah al-Din (Baiji and Shirqat); (6) Diyala (Muqdadiya, Jalawla and Saadiya; (7) Hawija and (8) Mosul, all in priority displacement-affected governorates as outlined in the National Plan. The main task of the ABCs is to develop, implement, and monitor area-level durable solutions Plans of Actions (PoAs) jointly with authorities, displacement-affected communities, and a wide range of additional stakeholders (other organizations working in the area and local government departments). The PoAs aim to provide a joint and coherent basis for all relevant actors – federal and regional authorities, humanitarian, recovery, development and peacebuilding organizations and donors and communities – to identify, plan and implement durable solutions at the operational level in a collective and coordinated way, under the leadership of the Government.

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
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# 1. INTRODUCTION

Anbar is the largest governorate in the country but also the most sparsely populated. The governorate has two Plans of Action (PoA) to ensure effective coordination at the local level by dividing it into East and West groups.

During the ISIL conflict which started in 2014, fighting forced more than 1.5 million people to flee from their habitual residences, including 350,000 from the catchment areas in west Anbar.

Figure 1: Anbar's number of IDP by governorate of displacement




As of December 2022, 35,436 IDPs of the total internally displaced person population in Iraq originated from Anbar governorate. The majority of them are hosted in Anbar with 25,698 (73%) individuals, and Babylon with 9,174 individuals (26%), while the rest are hosted in Baghdad (282 individuals), Salah al-Din (180 individuals), Ninewa (72 individuals), Kirkuk (24 individuals) and Diyala (6 people).<sup>1</sup>

As a direct result of the military operation of liberation, the governorate witnessed a large-scale return where a total of 1,546,680 returnees returned to their areas of origin by the end of 2022.

670,746 individuals were hosted inside the province, while the governorates of last displacement for the rest included Baghdad which hosted 325,944 individuals, Erbil with 247,704 individuals, Kirkuk with 154,812 individuals, and Sulaymaniyah which hosted 124,638 individuals.

Figure 2: Anbar's number of returnees by governorate of last displacement



1 IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) Dataset Round 128, covering the months of Oct, Nov and Dec 2022



## 2. SITUATION AND CONTEXT ANALYSIS

The aim of the Plan of Action is to set out a strategy that will resolve the displacement of 35,436 IDPs including those originally from west Anbar who remain in displacement while

also ensuring that the return of the 345,366 individuals, out of the total returnees 1,546,680 individuals is sustainable.

Table 1: Number of IDPs by District of Displacement & Returnees by District of Return

# of IDPs by District of Displacement		VS	# of Returnees by District of Return	
Households	Individuals	District	Households	Individuals
382	2,292	Al-Ka'im	17,622	105,732
444	2,664	Al-Rutba	4,407	26,442
319	1,914	Ana	2,500	15,000
3,074	18,444	Falluja	95,423	572,538
181	1,086	Haditha	4,643	27,858
230	1,380	Heet	30,036	180,216
1,276	7,656	Ramadi	100,389	602,334
		Ra'ua	2,760	16,560
<b>5,906</b>	<b>35,436</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>257,780</b>	<b>1,546,680</b>

### 2.1 Displacement overview

As of 31 December 2022, DTM<sup>2</sup> identified 35,436 IDPs (5,906 households) in the entire of Anbar governorate including the west areas. This is a decrease of 48 individuals compared to the round 124 period dated 31 December 2021. The gradual reduction in the number of IDPs is related to the significant barriers that many IDPs face in returning to their areas of origin. Additionally, the vast majority were settled in protracted displacement.

The most significant decreases in IDPs are recorded in the eastern areas of the province including Falluja (1,074 individuals), Al-Rutba (126 individuals), and then followed by the districts in the western areas, namely Haditha (12 individuals), Heet, and Ana (6 individuals) each.

However, it has been noted that the number of IDPs has increased in the district of Ramadi by (810 individuals), followed by the district of Al-Qaim (366 individuals).

Table 2: Number of IDPs by District of Displacement

Period ended Dec 2021			Period ended Dec 2022		
District of Displacement	Households	Individuals	Households	Individuals	Decrease/ Increased
Al-Qa'im	321	1,926	382	2,292	366
Al-Rutba	465	2,790	444	2,664	-126
Ana	320	1,920	319	1,914	-6
Falluja	3,253	19,518	3,074	18,444	-1,074
Haditha	183	1,098	181	1,086	-12
Heet	231	1,386	230	1,380	-6
Ramadi	1,141	6,846	1,276	7,656	810
<b>Total</b>	<b>5,914</b>	<b>35,484</b>	<b>5,906</b>	<b>35,436</b>	<b>-48</b>


### 2.1.1 Heet

As a direct result of the last conflict with ISIL, 1,380 people (230 families) from Heet district remain displaced with 234 individuals (17%) from Hay Al-Jabal-Markaz Heet, 156 individuals (11%) from Al Muhamdee-Markaz Heet, 156 individuals (11%) from Al-Shuhdaa 1-Al-Baghdady, and 102 individuals (7%) from Hay- Amina-Markaz Heet.<sup>3</sup>

A large number of Heet's IDPs 1,314 (95%) are displaced

within Anbar governorate, while 12 individual (1%) are displaced in Ninewa, and 30 individuals (2%) in Salah Al-Din. Out of the total 1,380 IDPs, 1,368 (99%) are currently living in an apartment and/or house (not owned), while 12 individuals (1%) are living in unfinished and/or abandoned building.

Figure 3: Heet IDP's governorate of displacement and location of origin



3 Ibid. page 3


### 2.1.2. Haditha

As a direct result of the last conflict with ISIL, 1,068 people (181 families) from Haditha district are still displaced. 246 individuals (23%) are from Hay Al Yarmuk, 138 individuals (13%) from Hay Al-Subhani, 90 individuals (8%) from Markaz Haditha, while 120 individuals (11%) from Hay Barwanah Al Gharbiyah which belongs to Barwana sub-district. Lastly

102 individuals (9%) are from Hay Al Salam in Haqlaniya<sup>4</sup>.

The majority of Haditha's IDPs 894 (82%) are displaced within Anbar, while 150 individuals (14%) are displaced in Salah Al-Din, 30 individuals (3%) in Ninewa and 12 individuals (1%) in Kirkuk, taken into account that all of the IDPs are living in apartment and/or house (not owned).

Figure 4: Haditha IDP's governorate of displacement and location of origin




### 2.1.3. Anah

As a direct result of the last conflict with ISIL, 1,914 people (319 families) from Ana district remain displaced. 846 of these individuals (44%) are from Al bor (Shishan), 516 individuals (27%) from Al Tadamon and 216 individuals (11%)

from Hay Al Salam.<sup>5</sup> The majority of Anah IDPs 1,728 (90%) are displaced within Anbar, while 186 individuals (10%) are displaced in Baghdad.

Figure 5: Anah IDP's governorate of displacement and location of origin



4 IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) Dataset Round 128, covering the months of Oct, Nov and Dec 2022.


5 IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) Dataset Round 128, covering the months of Oct, Nov and Dec 2022.

## 2.1.4. Qaim

As a direct result of the last conflict with ISIL, 2,292 people (382 families) from Al-Qaim, including Rummanh, are still displaced with 396 individuals (17%) from Al Ubaydi-3, 366 individuals (16%) from Markaz Al-Qaim-Sadah, 282 individuals (12%) from Hay Al Shuhadaa-Markaz Al-Qaim, 246 individuals (11%) from Al Ubaydi-2-Al-Obaidi,

and 234 (10%) from Wazeeriya in Markaz Al-Qaim<sup>6</sup>. All of Qaim's IDPs 2,292 (100%) are displaced within Anbar governorate. 2,106 (92%) IDPs are living in apartment and/or house (not owned), while 144 (6%) are living with host families, and 42 (2%) are living in a tent/Caravan/makeshift shelter/mud or block house.

Figure 6: Qaim IDP's governorate of displacement and location of origin



## 2.2 Return overview

As of 31 December 2022, DTM<sup>7</sup> identified 1,542,492 returnees (257,780 households) in the entire Anbar governorate including the west areas. This is an increase of 4,188 individuals compared to data collected from 31 December 2021. This increase in the number of returnees is related to the

improvement of the overall situation in their areas of origin. The most significant increases in return are recorded in the east areas of the province including Falluja (1,728 individuals), and then followed by the district in the western areas, namely Al-Qaim (1,464 individuals).

Table 3: Number of Returnees by District of Return

District of Return	Period ended Dec 2021		Period ended Dec 2022		
	Households	Individuals	Households	Individuals	Decrease/Increased
Al-Ka'im	17,378	104,268	17,622	105,732	1,464
Al-Rutba	4,496	26,976	4,407	26,442	-534
Ana	2,481	14,886	2,500	15,000	114
Falluja	95,135	570,810	95,423	572,538	1,728
Haditha	4,618	27,708	4,643	27,858	150
Heet	29,979	179,874	30,036	180,216	342
Ramadi	100,264	601,584	100,389	602,334	750
Ra'ua	2,731	16,386	2,760	16,560	174
<b>Total</b>	<b>257,082</b>	<b>1,542,492</b>	<b>257,780</b>	<b>1,546,680</b>	<b>4,188</b>

6 Ibid. page 5

7 IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) Dataset Round 128, covering the months of Oct, Nov and Dec 2022.

## 2.3 Conditions in locations of return

This section uses two tools to assist in understanding the severity of conditions in return locations. These scales are 1) livelihoods and basic services, and 2) social cohesion and safety perceptions. The scales are used to measure drivers of severity.<sup>8</sup>

Regarding the scale of the livelihoods and basic services in west Anbar, the number of the people living in medium

severity conditions stands at 143,238 individuals (41%) while the rest 201,390 individuals (58%) living in low severity.

In line with above, the number of the people living in high severity conditions stands at 53,514 individuals (15%) while 264,870 individuals (77%) live in medium severity according to the scale of the social cohesion and safety perceptions.

Figure 7: Proportion of returnees in west Anbar by overall severity



8 Return Index Round 17, covering the months of October, November and December 2022. The Return Index is a tool designed to measure the severity of conditions in locations of return. It provides data on 16 different indicators related to 1) livelihoods and basic services, and 2) safety perceptions and social cohesion. For each assessed location of return, the severity score is calculated. The scores range from 0 (all essential conditions for return are met) to 100 (no essential conditions for return are met). Higher scores denote more severe living conditions for returnees. The scores are grouped into three categories of severity: low, medium and high (which also includes very high).

### 2.3.1 Heet

Amongst all 180,216 returnees in Heet, 47,202 individuals are living in high severity locations in terms of social cohesion and safety perceptions. 18,912 (10%) returnees are living in overall high severity conditions, with the majority in Al-Baghdadi sub-district, namely 594 individuals in Al-Sirajiyah, 1200 individuals in Al-Jananiyah, 756 individuals in Khazraj, 720

individuals in Zakhikhah, in addition to other hundreds of people living in Al-Forat sub-district, namely 1,122 in kibae, 7,260 people in Tal aswad and 7,260 in Zoyah Al-sharqiyah.

It's worth noting that no individuals are living in locations classified as high severity in either Kubaisa or Markez Heet but only living in locations classified as medium or low severity.

Table 4: Returnees in Heet by severity of access to livelihoods and basic services

SCALE 1: Livelihoods and basic services	Location	Individuals	Percentage
Medium	33	69,294	38%
Low	35	110,922	62%
Grand Total	68	180,216	100%
SCALE 2: Social cohesion and safety perceptions	Location	Individuals	Percentage
High	14	47,202	26%
Medium	53	131,646	73%
Low	1	1,368	1%
Grand Total	68	180,216	100%
OVERALL SEVERITY INDEX	Location	Individuals	Percentage
High	7	18,912	10%
Medium	51	121,602	67%
Low	10	39,702	22%
Grand Total	68	180,216	100%

### 2.3.2 Haditha

Amongst all 27,858 returnees in Haditha, a large number are living in locations classified as high severity. 444 individuals in Al Zawya village are living in high severity according to the access to livelihoods and basic services, while 1,830 individuals in Albu Hayat are living in high severity conditions according to the access to social cohesion and safety perceptions scale.

Both locations are located within Haqlaniya sub-district.

It's worth mentioning that no individuals are living in locations classified as high severity in either In Barwana and Markaz Haditha, all individuals are living in locations classified as medium or low severity, with none in high severity conditions.

Table 5: Returnees in Haditha by severity of access to livelihoods and basic services

SCALE 1: Livelihoods and basic services	Location	Individuals	Percentage
High	1	444	2%
Medium	3	3,678	13%
Low	27	23,736	85%
Grand Total	31	27,858	100%

SCALE 2: Social cohesion and safety perceptions	Location	Individuals	Percentage
High	3	2,388	9%
Medium	17	11,610	42%
Low	11	13,860	50%
Grand Total	31	27,858	100%

OVERALL SEVERITY INDEX	Location	Individuals	Percentage
High	2	2,274	8%
Medium	9	6,840	25%
Low	20	18,744	67%
Grand Total	31	27,858	100%

### 2.3.3 Anah

Amongst all 15,000 returnees in Anah, no individuals are living in locations classified as high severity regarding either livelihoods and basics services or the social cohesion & safety perceptions. However, thousands are living in locations

classified as medium or low severity. The people living in medium severity are residing in three locations, namely 750 individuals in Al Madid, 744 individuals in Al-Awany Village and 2,496 individuals in Hay Al-Rayhana.

Table 6: Returnees in Anah by severity of access to livelihoods and basic services

SCALE 1: Livelihoods and basic services	Location	Individuals	Percentage
Medium	5	5,646	38%
Low	7	9,354	62%
Grand Total	12	15,000	100%

SCALE 2: Social cohesion and safety perceptions	Location	Individuals	Percentage
Medium	2	3,246	22%
Low	10	11,754	78%
Grand Total	12	15,000	100%

OVERALL SEVERITY INDEX	Location	Individuals	Percentage
Medium	3	3,990	27%
Low	9	11,010	73%
Grand Total	12	15,000	100%

### 2.3.4 Qaim

Amongst all 105,732 returnees in Qaim, many individuals are living in locations classified as high severity, namely 294 (<1%) individuals regarding access to livelihoods and basic services, and 3,924 (4%) individuals regarding access to social cohesion and safety perceptions. The overall population who are living in high severity condition is 1,788 (2%). The majority of them are in Al-Obaidi sub-district, namely 222 people in Al Masharea, and 294 individuals in complex of

phosphate company. The remaining returnees are living in Al-Rummanah, with 726 individuals in Al Baghoz village, and 546 individuals in Al Jbariyah village.

It's worth mentioning that no individuals are living in locations classified as high severity but only living in locations classified as medium severity with regards to livelihoods and basic services.

Table 7: Returnees in Qaim by severity of access to livelihoods and basic services

SCALE 1: Livelihoods and basic services	Location	Individuals	Percentage
High	1	294	0%
Medium	30	57,624	55%
Low	14	47,814	45%
Grand Total	45	105,732	100%

SCALE 2: Social cohesion and safety perceptions	Location	Individuals	Percentage
High	6	3,924	4%
Medium	39	101,808	96%
Grand Total	45	105,732	100%

OVERALL SEVERITY INDEX	Location	Individuals	Percentage
High	4	1,788	2%
Medium	41	103,944	98%
Grand Total	45	105,732	100%

## 2.4 Movement intentions and obstacles to durable solutions

To understand the movement intentions of IDPs, the following data has been extracted from the Integrated Location Assessment (ILA - VII)<sup>9</sup>.

### 2.4.1 Short-Term Intentions


In Anbar governorate, at the time of the survey (April–June 2022), the short-term intentions for the overwhelming majority of IDPs (97%) was to stay in their current location. Meanwhile, if assistance to return were to be provided to

IDPs, ILA data shows that IDPs in 51% of the assessed locations indicate that they would have an intention of returning, while representatives of IDPs in 44% of assessed locations indicate that most IDPs would still not return.

<sup>9</sup> ILA gathers detailed information on displaced and returnee families living in locations identified through the latest round of the Master list. Available from <https://iraqdtm.iom.int/ILA7>.




Figure 8: Short-Term Intentions of IDPs about return to Anbar



Regarding the reasons behind IDPs not wanting to return, linked to their location in displacement, 25% of IDPs indicated that their location of displacement provided better safety and security, while 23% noted that living conditions were better in the location of displacement.

Meanwhile, the reasons linked to the locations of return causing IDPs not wanting to return included 56% naming the lack of housing as a reason, 49% mentioned the lack of livelihoods, 48% noted blocked returns, and 42% indicated that they have no financial means to return. The full list of these reasons can be found in Figure 8.


Figure 9: Why IDPs don't want to return to Anbar.



### 2.4.2 Long-Term Intentions

In Anbar, at the time of the survey (April–June 2022), the long-term intentions for 58% of IDPs was undecided, 31% intend to locally integrate in their current location, and 10% intend on returning to their place of origin.


Figure 10: Long-Term Intentions of IDPs about return to Anbar



The main reasons indicated for returning, linked to the location of displacement, included 49% of IDPs indicating that they lack the financial means to return, 29% mentioning worsening livelihoods/services, while 12% indicated that they failed to integrate with the host community.

Meanwhile, the main reasons to return linked to the location of return included 66% mentioning an emotional desire to return, 32% stating that their location of return is safe, while 28% indicated that availability of assistance encourages them to return. The full list of these reasons can be found in Figure 11.

Figure 11: Why IDPs want to return to Anbar.



## 3. OVERVIEW OF ACTIVITY MAPPING

### 3.1 UN Agencies and INGOs

Overall, 169 interventions were identified as active programmes in different sectors in west Anbar. These activities are either ongoing or planned to be implemented by partners (UN-Agencies and INGOs) in 2023-2024. Most of the interventions are in Al-Qaim district (63%), followed by Ana (23%), and Haditha (5%). In terms of the sectors, Livelihoods (27%), Social Cohesion (19%), Safety and Security


(12%), Health (11%), WASH (8%), and Education (8%) have the highest number of interventions.

Twelve partners are present in many subdistricts across districts providing multisectoral assistance for IDPs, returnees, and host communities. The organizations are namely UNDP, Human Appeal, UNHCR, WFP, NRC, UNICEF, IOM, War Child UK (WCUK), IRC, ICRC, UNHABITAT, and DARY.

Table 8: UN agencies & INGOs ongoing/planned activities per sector/location 2023-2024

Specific Objectives	Al-Qaim	Ana	Haditha	Heet	Ra'ua	Total
SO1 Government leadership						
SO2 Housing and HLP	1					1
SO3 Livelihoods	23	19	1	2		45
SO4 Basic Services	4	4	2	2	3	15
SO4 Education	6	1	2		4	13
SO4 WASH	9	2		2		13
SO4 Health	18					18
SO4 Food Security						
SO4 Electricity	7	1			1	9
SO4 Social Protection						
SO5 Documentation & Rights						
SO6 Social Cohesion	16	12	4			32
SO7 Safety & security	19			1		20
SO8 Facilitated Movements	3					3
<b>Total Activities</b>	<b>106</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>169</b>

Figure 12: UN agencies &amp; INGOs ongoing/planned activities per sector &amp; location 2023-2024



### 3.2 Government

Overall, 355 interventions were identified as active programmes in different sectors in West Anbar. Only 8 projects are currently ongoing, while the majority are planned to be implemented by the government in 2023-2024. Most of the interventions are in Heet (38%), followed by


Rummanah (18%), Rawa (14%), and equally in Ana, Haditha, Qaim (10%). In terms of the sectors, Electricity (19%), Water (18%), Education (17%), Municipality (11%), Roads & Bridges (9%) have the highest number of interventions.

Table 9: Government ongoing/planned activities per sector &amp; location in 2023-2024.

Sector	Ana	Haditha	Heet	Qaim	Rawa	Rummanah	Grand Total
Agriculture	1		4	1	3	7	16
Archaeology						1	1
Communications			3		3		6
Culture						1	1
Education		7	28	7	9	10	61
Electricity	5	4	33	9	10	7	68
Endowments					1		1
Finance			1				1
Health		1	8		4	4	17
Housing	2				1		3
Interior Ministry			2			2	4
Justice			2			2	4

Sector	Ana	Haditha	Heet	Qaim	Rawa	Rummanah	Grand Total
Livelihood		1		1	3		5
Local Administration	3					1	4
Municipalities	2	4	21		4	7	38
Roads & Bridges	4	8	5	8		7	32
Sewage	6				3	1	10
Sports and Youth	2	2	2		5	4	15
Veterinary					1		1
Water	7	7	25	11	4	9	63
Water Resources	3		1				4
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>135</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>51</b>	<b>63</b>	<b>355</b>

Figure 13: Government ongoing/planned activities per sector and location in 2023-2024



### 3.3 Community Consultations

The West Anbar ABC group conducted community consultations aimed at reviewing priorities to ensure that the Durable Solution plans, needs and gaps in the priority locations are agreeable to the relevant communities and are reflected in the POA. The first community consultations were conducted in 2021, however more focus group discussions (FGD) were organized during 2022 to consider fresh feedback from this consultation. These FGDs covered many locations including but not limited to Al-Qaim and Rummanah. Many people participated in the discussions

such as returnees, host community, tribal and/or community leaders, women, youth, elderly and religious groups, as well as other populations deemed important in ABC area.

The majority of the participants in these community consultations are concerned that (i) the government of Anbar will keep ignoring the western parts and (ii) there is not enough intervention by INGOs compared to the huge number of vulnerable people in need.

While the initial plan is to widely meet the requirements of

the targeted communities, participants and key informants also requested to add more activities as summarized and listed in below.

- a. Construction of new government buildings.
- b. Implement livelihood projects and focus on agricultural and industrial development.
- c. Distribution of livestock and feed.
- d. Establishing entertainment centers for women, children, and youth.
- e. Empowering and supporting women through the launch

of VTCs and the awarding of small and medium-sized businesses.

- f. Supporting education via the rehabilitation and/or construction of new schools and kindergartens.
- g. Installing electric columns including lighting system.
- h. Rehabilitating water network and extend water treatment plan.
- i. Installing Reverse Osmosis-RO water system in the village
- j. Supporting the municipality in terms of creating green zones in the area and children's football fields.

## 4. OVERVIEW OF SECTORAL NEEDS AND CHALLENGES

### 4.1. Government Leadership

The Government of Iraq, with the support of international and local actors, has made strides in working towards inclusive area-based plans that started with the development of the National Plan and the continued efforts to implement policies and plans in different sectors linked to addressing displacement concerns. Under the National Plan for Getting Back the IDPs Back to their Liberated Areas, the Government emphasized that identified obstacles for IDPs to return to the province include the lack of access to documentation, trauma and psychological barriers as a result of actions perpetrated by ISIL, and non-acceptance of widows and children of persons with perceived affiliation to ISIL. Under

the National Plan, the Government also identified the need to restore basic services in water, electricity, education, health, and so on. Other gaps and needs are as follows:

- a. Advocate for more financial allocation for the housing compensation scheme.
- b. Low-cost housing for fully damaged housing.
- c. Demining contaminated and damaged housing.
- d. Facilitating returns to no-return or blocked-areas, especially in Qaim district.

### 4.2 Housing and Housing, Land and Property (HLP)

#### 4.2.2 Severity of Conditions

Housing destruction and the absence of reconstruction are key drivers of severity across many locations in west Anbar. Overall, results from the assessments show that target areas are mostly affected by i) the absence of reconstruction efforts for fully destroyed or highly damaged houses, ii) the insecure

government-funded compensation, and iii) the exclusion of ISIL-related homeowners from housing rehabilitation efforts.

The number of damaged houses and housing units is nearing 12,000 houses<sup>10</sup>, with varying damage rates, in different cities of the Anbar governorate.

<sup>10</sup> Directorate of Planning in Anbar.

Table 10: Destruction of houses in west Anbar.

District	Sub-district	Damage (30-70%)	Damage (70-100%)
Heet	Center	243	178
	Baghdadi	183	261
	Furat	121	239
	Kubaisa	204	16
	Muhemedi	29	17
Haditha	Haditha	4,000	2,000
Al-Qaim	Center	1,575	300
	Karablah	177	73
	Obaidi	300	75
Rummanah	Raummanah	475	125
Anah	Center	135	30
	Ryhanah	145	93
	Al-Sagrah	95	67
	Hussei Complex & villages	25	10
Rawa	Rawa	378	222
<b>Total</b>		<b>8,085</b>	<b>3,706</b>

### 4.3 Livelihoods

Overall, results of the qualitative assessments<sup>11</sup> show that target areas are mostly affected by the intertwined problem of low productive capacities and the existence of a small and constrained private sector, which limit people's options to overcome vulnerability. Indeed, low skilled labor, low quality and low productivity jobs and the inability of the private sector to absorb the unemployed due to multiple factors, are prominent features across the target areas.

Livelihood interventions seem to have the potential to develop and expand MSMEs affected by the ISIL conflict and the COVID-19 pandemic, which could also help absorb more IDPs and returnees into the workforce. Business grants for creation or expansion of projects, business development services trainings (BDS), and asset replacement were suggested but not specified. Vocational Trainings (VTs) were also suggested, and most jobseekers mentioned a preference to own their business, with the primary reason for not having done so being the lack of capital.

Overall, the rapid assessment in Anbar shows that the market is active and structured around different types of businesses and skills and covers most of the districts. Sales from business owners are reported to be good, but their stability remains fragile due to limited cash flow from customers, with a particular negative impact observed during the recession and the COVID-19 crisis. This shows that the financial situation of entrepreneurs is unstable. There is progress in market development but limited understanding of business owners on how to create new business opportunities. A few sectors appear to be recovering and have demand, despite the destruction and looting recorded in the aftermath of the liberation.

The challenges for businesses are many, including low purchasing power, checkpoints, high rent costs, and poor electricity supply among other issues, while demand for capital is also high. The construction, automotive, and manufacturing sectors reported good demand compared with other sectors.

11 UNDP FFS Sectoral Assessment July 2022.

## 4.4 Basic Services

### 4.4.1. Education

Overall, assessment results show that the education sector suffers from many obstacles including:

- a. A shortage of school buildings leads to student overcrowding. The inability to absorb the growth in the number of registered students was reflected in the increase in the number of schools operating in a double or triple-shift system. Classrooms should have an average of 25 students (standard), but there are currently classrooms with up to 50 students. A lot of schools run two or even three shifts per day, which leads to poor learning

conditions and negatively impacts the quality of education. In Anbar, there are currently 1,260 primary schools (14,031 classrooms) with 394,253 students, with an average overcrowding rate of 106 percent (reaches 115 percent in some schools).<sup>12</sup> While the situation of the schools in the east part of the province has the most populous facilities, the severity of conditions is deplorable and requiring immediate action to rehabilitate and furnish the schools.

Table 11: Overcrowding in Primary Schools in West Anbar

District	Neighborhood	Number of Primary Schools	Number of Students	Number of classes according to the standard 30 students per class	Actual number of classes	% Utilization of classes
Heet	Center	72	21,561	719	1,068	67%
Heet	Al-Baghdadi	51	7,452	248	391	64%
Heet	Kabisa	9	3,291	110	132	83%
Heet	Alfurat	24	7,625	254	316	80%
Anaa	Center	29	4,946	165	263	63%
Anaa	Alrayhana	5	836	28	56	50%
Haditha	Center	31	9,385	313	434	72%
Haditha	Haqlaniyah	26	4,578	153	250	61%
Haditha	Bruwana	22	6,133	204	285	72%
Rawa	Center	29	2,889	96	173	56%
Al-Qaim	Center	29	10,861	362	461	79%
Al-Qaim	Alkarabila	34	12,800	427	414	103%
Al-Qaim	Alrumaana	26	4,642	155	210	74%

- b. Understaffing in schools undermines the learning process. One of the main challenges facing the education system is the lack of adequate and qualified teachers in many schools. This affects the quality and equity of education, as students do not receive the instruction and support they need to learn effectively. The current policy of relying on volunteer teachers, who often lack the necessary skills and training, is not a sustainable solution.

In a nutshell, the education sector suffers from the lack of necessary funding. This problem hinders efforts to improve the school building situation. Like most sectors in the governorate, almost the entire budget of the Directorate of Education is spent on the payment of salaries and pensions, leaving no funds or little for the construction of new schools, the maintenance of existing ones, or hiring more (qualified) teachers.

12 UNDP FFS Sectoral Assessment July 2022



#### 4.4.2. Water

Overall, assessment results show that target areas are mostly affected by i) low water levels requiring improvements in water treatment plants, ii) high pressure on the water network, iii) the existence of old piping systems, and iv) low resourced and understaffed water directorates.

a. One of the main challenges facing the water treatment plants (WTPs) is the low water level in the rivers that supply them. Due to climate change and upstream dams, the Tigris and Euphrates rivers have experienced a significant drop in their water levels, affecting the intake platforms of the WTPs. To ensure a reliable and adequate water supply for the population, it is necessary to extend the intake platforms of the WTPs further into the river, where the water depth is sufficient for pumping.

b. Pumping stations and storage tanks rehabilitation can reduce pressure on the network. To boost the capacity of the water coming from the Water Treatment Plants, there are two ways of keeping the pressure on the grid, either through gravity-fed elevated tanks or ground storage tank, or by using boosting stations which use electrical pumps to keep the pressure on.

c. Loss of water is due to the existing old piping systems. Most of the existing water pipeline network is more than 50 years old and a lot of the records for it have been lost. Despite the WTPs pumping around the clock, and the pressure on the system, the actual delivery of water to many neighborhoods is still lagging.

#### 4.4.3 Electricity

The electricity supply remains insufficient to meet the demand in the governorate. The total electrical power requirements for Anbar are estimated at 1,100–1,350 MW, while the total power delivered to the governorate is 700 MW in the best case, including what is generated from the two power plants (Haditha Hydro and Haditha Diesel). What is being

delivered to residential areas ranges between 8-10 hours per day due to a lack of supply from the national network and the presence of major bottlenecks in transmission lines and substations. To meet their needs, consumers resort to buying electric power from diesel generators owned by private investors in residential areas.

Table 12: Electricity Demand and Supply in Anbar<sup>13</sup>

Branch	Demand (MW)	Supply (MW)	Percentage (%)
Central Anbar	550	190	35
East Anbar	450	165	37
Highest Euphrates	350	90	26
<b>Total</b>	<b>1,350</b>	<b>445</b>	<b>33</b>

In a nutshell, the results of the assessments indicate that i) the current supply remains insufficient to meet the demand

for electricity and ii) rehabilitation efforts continue to be required to improve power transmission and distribution.

#### 4.4.4 Health

Overall, results from the assessments show that target areas are mostly affected by i) a lack of healthcare facilities and a shortage of specialized staff, ii) low government investment in the health sector, and iii) poor medical waste management processes and practices. The demolition of the health sector's infrastructure and equipment makes it the single-most

expensive public sector to rebuild. Not only were hospitals and PHCCs destroyed, and equipment stolen, but many hospitals and clinics were built and equipped decades ago and are no longer in line with modern medical standards.<sup>14</sup> The infrastructure damage and destruction of a large number of health care facilities are considered as primary threats to

<sup>13</sup> Electricity Directorate in Anbar, 2022

<sup>14</sup> UNDP FFS Sectoral Assessment July 2022.

public health services in the governorate. The infrastructure of most health institutions in the governorate is old, especially general hospitals. Many of them have been renovated or rehabilitated, however the increase in population over the past years, making buildings unsuitable for good quality health services provision.

PHCC services are provided through a network of PHCCs, and sub-centers managed by DoH. Some of these are poorly

equipped and barely operational. About half of the centers are staffed with at least one medical doctor. The rest have trained health workers (medical assistants and nurses). The shortage in medical specialties affects the process of providing medical services in west Anbar. Medical cases in need of special services are transferred to the neighboring governorates, namely the capital Baghdad and Erbil.

#### 4.4.5. Municipality

Assessment results show that there is a remarkable similarity in the reasons for the problems and complications in delivering municipal services according to each sub-sector, such as understaffing, damaged resources, and poor maintenance 15.

The solid waste sector is managed by the Municipality Directorate, with additional inputs for the Directorate for the Environment, which plays an advisory role. Unfortunately, there are serious problems with the whole 'chain' of solid waste management.

Depending on catchment population, dozens/hundreds of tons of waste have to be collected from people's homes, taken to intermediate sorting areas, and then either moved to the landfills, incinerated, or recycled. There are major problems with the length of this chain.

a. The first step in the chain is to gather the waste at people's homes, and this is where the complications begin. First, and despite the frequent campaigns by the government and NGOs, there is still a strong tendency in many neighborhoods to not sort garbage and to put it all

together in whichever bins are available, or to just throw it out on the street. Second, neighborhoods have too few specific collection areas for garbage collection with waterproof/odorless metal containers for easy collection of waste, and no waste-specific bins for organics, plastics, etc. There is no culture of waste sorting or recycling at all in the areas.

- b. The second step is to collect this garbage. The Municipality has a real problem here with a lack of garbage trucks. The Municipality has a schedule to try and serve all neighborhoods in the city equally, but with so few trucks, there are lengthy delays.
- c. The third step is practically entirely missing – intermediate sorting areas linked to a wider waste management plan that organizes which type of waste goes where, what gets dumped, burned, and recycled. At this point, the whole approach is to collect what is possible, and dump it all at landfills outside the cities.

#### 4.4.6. Roads & Bridges

Inadequate repairs and maintenance have contributed to a pronounced deterioration in village roads, which have been neglected to the extent that reconstruction, rather than rehabilitation, is needed along much of the rural road network. This has diminished access to markets and social services in many rural areas and contributes to isolation.

In Anbar, the governorate's roads suffer from the following key issues:

- a. Axial weights that exceed global limits are the main reason behind large defects (deep rutting, cracks, deterioration, potholes ...) in most of its roads, especially the main ones.
- b. The aging of the surfaces of many roads, which led to

their erosion, peeling, cracking, or the appearance of all previously mentioned defects on them.

- c. Failure to carry out thorough and proper maintenance for more than ten years for most parts of the roads. All secondary roads are completely neglected, while local roads suffer from design problems and obsolescence.
- d. All roads (main, secondary, and local) are almost completely free from surface painting and traffic signs of all kinds, free from pedestrian crossing signs or paint, devoid of pedestrian crossing bridges, and no proper illumination systems.

Many rivers and valleys pass through Anbar Governorate.

15 Ibid.

The Euphrates River valleys and streams need bridges for vehicles and pedestrians to pass through their banks. The Haditha district dam also serves as a bridge in addition to its main role; controlling water level released into the basin of

the river. There are 93 concrete and steel bridges of varying types (except expressway bridges), 4 H-pile bridges and 22 floating bridges; 9 of them need to be replaced by concrete bridges.<sup>16</sup>

Table 13: Bridges in west Anbar

District	Bridge	Length (m)
Haditha	Horan bridge	118
	Hajlan Wadi bridge 1	120
	Hajlan wadi bridge 2	213
	Fuhaimy wadi bridge	120
Rawa	Rawa bridge	758
Al- Qaim	Rummana bridge	480
Heet	Heet steel bridge	241

In conclusion, the majority of the bridges need an inspection of pads, expansion joints, hand and safety rails, and the structures from the bottom of the bridges. So far, none of the bridges have shown any defects or failures except for

the need to replace some of the expansion joints. It is also very important to replace the temporary bridges with new concrete ones before they become fully deteriorated and potentially collapse.

#### 4.4.7. Sewage

Establishing and expanding sewage treatment stations and networks, as well as rainwater networks, remains a priority. The percentage of the urban population served by rainwater networks reached 38% in 2021, and is concentrated in the districts of Heet, Kubaisa, Anah, Rawa, Al-Qaim. The percentage of the unserved population has reached 62

percent, and is concentrated in the districts of Heet, Kubaisa, Anah, Rawa, Al-Qaim, and Haditha.

One main public health risk related to sanitation currently prevailing in the governorate is the bypassing of citizens on rainwater networks, which flow directly into the river. This in turn increases water pollution and health-related risks.

Table 14: Wastewater Treatment Facilities in Anbar

District or sub-district	Is there a sewage treatment plant or not	Treatment method	Station capacity m3/day
Anah	Anah treatment plant	Physical	3,600
Al-Qa'im/Alobidi	Al-Obaidi treatment plant	-	400
Kabisa	Kabisa treatment plant	-	400

Source: Anbar Sewage Directorate, 2021

Suggestions to reduce the proportion of untreated wastewater include making domestic water treatment technologies available on and off site, with proper operation and maintenance; monitoring and regulating the sources of industrial wastewater generation through discharge permits,

either to the sewage and/or to the environment; holding violators accountable for the application of laws related to wastewater treatment, especially factory and workshops' owners, as well as industrial facilities to eliminate the current deficit in draining sewage water.

<sup>16</sup> Anbar Roads and Bridges Department, 2021

Table 15: Public and Common Sewage Network Service in Anbar

District or sub-district	Population	Sewage			Rainwater Drainage		
		Beneficiaries (Urban)	Beneficiaries % (Urban)	Non-beneficiaries % (Urban)	Beneficiaries (Urban)	Beneficiaries % (Urban)	Non-beneficiaries % (Urban)
Anah	40,000	150,000	37.50%	62.50%	15,000	37.50%	62.50%
Heet	200,000	-	0%	100%	75,000	37.50%	62.50%
Kabisa	20,000	5,000	25%	75%	30,000	15%	85%
Haditha	50,000	0	0%	100%	0	0%	100%
Rawa	27,000	-	0%	100%	16,000	59%	41%
Qaim	150,000	5,000	3%	97%	18,000	12%	88%

Source: Anbar Sewage Directorate, 2021

## 4.5. Documentation and Rights

The objective of this project is to help displaced Iraqis obtain civil documents that prove their legal identity and enable them to access public services and rights. Many Iraqis lost their documents during the conflict with ISIL or were issued invalid ones by the group. This situation affects their ability to participate in the recovery and reconstruction of Iraq and exposes them to the risk of statelessness. The

humanitarian community has assisted many Iraqis in restoring their documents, but there are still thousands of families and children who need this support. The project aims to address the challenges and barriers that prevent them from obtaining the necessary civil documents, such as the civil ID, the nationality card and the housing card.

## 4.6. Social Cohesion

More support to social cohesion and peacebuilding initiatives is required, particularly in Heet and Al-Kai'm. The need for social cohesion is not only due to the displacement and subsequent returns but also linked to affiliation to ISIL as well as tribalism. In Anbar, in some instances, returned IDPs with perceived affiliation have secondarily displaced after having been rejected by their communities of origin, which highlights important challenges to advancing towards a durable solution and to restoring trust and social peace. At the same time, communities have put in place mechanisms to facilitate and

regulate return. Despite their controversial nature, if tailored to comply with a rights-based approach and do-no-harm principles, these mechanisms could be used as entry points for interventions looking at facilitating accepted returns. Although some communities have advanced towards a more nuanced understanding that having cohabited with ISIL does not necessarily imply affiliation, community members who have family or tribal ties with those accused of having an affiliation continue to be perceived as sympathizers of the group.

## 4.7. Safety and Security

IOM's Report on Return Dynamics in Anbar<sup>17</sup> lists Al-Forat in Heet district and Markaz Ra'ua in Rawa district as high severity in terms of safety and security. Concerns related to unexploded ordnances, various sources of violence and

checkpoints controlled by other security actors remain critical. As a result, it remains difficult for some IDPs to return to their areas of origin.

17 IOM, DTM Return Dynamics in Anbar, June 2021.

## 5. INITIAL TARGET LOCATIONS

The Government and partners recognize that working towards durable solutions requires identifying feasible locations which partners collectively focus their efforts on until 2024. While the needs in the district are significant, capacity and resource constraints require prioritization, to yield the highest positive impact on the needs of communities to resolve displacement in a particular location.

An initial target location is a location that has been identified as feasible, with the presence of safety, access for partners, Government capacity to respond in the area, and the needs requiring collective effort over the medium to long-term to achieve specific durable solutions outcomes. The identification of initial target locations does not imply that partners cannot or should not target other locations with identified needs but rather that partners are committed to working together to provide a multisectoral response to specific locations to work towards durable solutions outcomes with limited resources.

The PoA is a living document and will be reviewed regularly. In accordance with assessment findings, activities impact and the evolution of the situation on

the ground, priority locations might be added or deemed completed during subsequent revisions of the PoA. In this section, an overview of the locations that are considered as priorities by the local Government for durable solutions needs, followed by the presence of partners, is presented. Afterwards, this section will provide the list of initial target locations to be specifically targeted under this PoA.

The local government as well as partners and displacement-affected populations in west Anbar consider the following areas as priority locations:

Table 16: List of initial target locations

Districts	Initial target subdistricts/ locations
Rummaneh	Markaz Rummaneh
Al-Ka'im	Markaz Ka'im, Karabla, See'da, T1 station
Ana	Ma'adhed (Al-Sagra) and Rayhana
Haditha	Haqlaniyah and Barwana
Heet	Al-Dolab, Hay Al-Baker, Al-Forat

## 6. INTER-AREA COORDINATION

The inter-area coordination in implementing this PoA will emphasize on coordination with the local government in each of the initial target locations, with partners who implement durable solutions interventions as well as with the host and affected communities. The coordination will

also be extended to the partners who support IDPs outside west Anbar, including Baghdad, the northern governorates and others.

## ANNEX A: IMPLEMENTATION PLAN

To be included.

## ANNEX B: MONITORING AND TRACKING

To be included.



**WEST ANBAR  
PLAN OF ACTION REVISION  
2021–2024**

حلول دائمة في العراق  
Iraq Durable Solutions

